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Abstract
Background: Modern software systems are deployed in sociotechnical set-
tings, combining social entities (humans and organizations) with technical en-
tities (software and devices). In such settings, on top of technical controls that
implement security features of software, regulations specify how users should
behave in security-critical situations. No matter how carefully the software is
designed and how well regulations are enforced, such systems are subject to
breaches due to social (user misuse) and technical (vulnerabilities in software)
factors. Breach reports, often legally mandated, describe what went wrong
during a breach and how the breach was remedied. However, breach reports
are not formally investigated in current practice, leading to valuable lessons
being lost regarding past failures.
Aim: Our research aim is to aid security analysts and software developers in
obtaining a set of legal, security, and privacy requirements, by developing a
crowdsourcing methodology to extract knowledge from regulations and breach
reports.
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Method: We present Çorba, a methodology that leverages human intelli-
gence via crowdsourcing, and extracts requirements from textual artifacts in
the form of regulatory norms. We evaluate Çorba on the US healthcare regu-
lations from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
and breach reports published by the US Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). Following this methodology, we have conducted a pilot and a
final study on the Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform.
Results: Çorba yields high quality responses from crowd workers, which we
analyze to identify requirements for the purpose of complementing HIPAA
regulations. We publish a curated dataset of the worker responses and identi-
fied requirements.
Conclusions: The results show that the instructions and question formats
presented to the crowd workers significantly affect the response quality re-
garding the identification of requirements. We have observed significant im-
provement from the pilot to the final study by revising the instructions and
question formats. Other factors, such as worker types, breach types, or length
of reports, do not have notable effect on the workers’ performance. Moreover,
we discuss other potential improvements such as breach report restructuring
and text highlighting with automated methods.
Keywords Regulatory norms, sociotechnical systems, HIPAA
1 Introduction
The development of sociotechnical systems requires the developers to com-
ply with existing regulations that describe the expected behaviors of software
and its users, particularly in domains that deal with private user information.
Existing studies [5, 16, 19, 32, 40] model or extract information from such reg-
ulatory documents to help with the elicitation of requirements for developers
or compliance checking for legal purposes.
One of the most studied regulations is the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) [20] in the healthcare domain, which
is a legislation on data privacy and security regarding medical information.
Textbox 1 shows an example clause from HIPAA regarding devices and media
containing electronic protected health information (PHI).
Textbox 1
§164.310 - Physical safeguards
A covered entity or business associate must, in accordance with §164.306:
§164.310(d)(1) - Standard: Device and media controls.
Implement policies and procedures that govern the receipt and removal
of hardware and electronic media that contain electronic protected health
information into and out of a facility, and the movement of these items
within the facility.
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This clause imposes a requirement on a covered entity (CE) or a business
associate (BA) regarding hardware and media.
Regulatory text is often abstruse and unclear as to requirements. Breaches
are frequently caused by social (user misbehavior) and technical (flaws in soft-
ware) violations. Breach reports [21, 34, 47], often legally mandated, describe
cases where deployed systems fail, or are maliciously or accidentally mis-
used [31, 41], and suggest actions to prevent, detect, and recover from future
breaches [28, 38]. Breach reports can help security analysts understand regu-
lations by providing instances where regulations are violated. For the above
clause, breaches can help in understanding why and how the “policies and
procedures” should be implemented.
In recent years, healthcare data breaches, caused by outside attacks as
well as insider misconducts, have brought HIPAA increasing prominence. US
law now requires the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
to post each breach of unsecured PHI affecting 500 or more individuals [21].
Textbox 2 provides an example report of the violation of the above clause. This
report includes actions taken by the responsible party after the breach, which
could inform prevention of, or recovery from, similar breaches. Such reports
sometimes include actions that other parties, such as Office for Civil Rights
(OCR), took after the breaches.
Textbox 2
1. An unencrypted portable data drive was lost by a pharmacy resident of
the Arnold Palmer Hospital, a part of the covered entity (CE).
2. The drive contained the protected health information (PHI) of 586 indi-
viduals, including names, birth weights, gestational age, admission and
discharge dates, medical record numbers, and some transfer dates.
3. The missing drive also stored personal items, a research study proposal,
and two spreadsheets containing limited information on 586 babies who
were part of a study.
4. The CE provided breach notification to HHS, the media, and to the
parents of the affected individuals because they were all minors.
5. Substitute notice was posted on the CE’s website.
6. The CE updated its policies and procedures for its data loss prevention
system and added controls.
7. The CE retrained the resident involved in the loss of data and pro-
vided additional information to all employees and medical staff mem-
bers regarding the use of portable data devices through education and
published articles.
8. OCR obtained assurances that the CE implemented the corrective ac-
tions listed above.
Our research aim is to aid security analysts and software developers in
obtaining a set of legal, security, and privacy requirements, by developing a
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crowdsourcing methodology to extract knowledge from regulations and breach
reports.
We adopt norms [3, 18, 24, 42, 48] to formalize regulations and breaches
(as violations of norms). Norms (here, deontic norms including commitments,
authorizations, and prohibitions) provide a compact, yet expressive formal-
ization. However, extracting norms from text is nontrivial: natural language
processing (NLP) methods yield low accuracy [9, 14, 25, 19], and trained ex-
perts are costly [7]. Like all textual artifacts, breach reports are often am-
biguous, inconsistent, and incomplete, which makes it hard to extract useful
information, thereby losing valuable knowledge. Crowdsourcing approaches
[7, 11, 15, 29, 33, 36, 49] that rely on collective human intelligence have gained
increasing attention for information extraction tasks regarding legal text. How-
ever, such approaches have not been applied to “end user reported” artifacts,
such as breach reports, or with the aim of connecting multiple artifacts. Ac-
cordingly, we present Çorba1, a methodology that leverages human intelli-
gence via crowdsourcing to obtain requirements by extracting and connecting
key elements from regulations and breach reports. We represent the obtained
requirements as a set of regulatory norms to provide a structured yet com-
pact presentation for practitioners. Specifically, we address the following core
research question toward the obtaining of requirements in the form of norms
from these textual artifacts:
RQ: How can we design a crowdsourcing task to effectively extract security
requirements from regulations and breach reports as norms, and what factors
affect the performance of crowd workers for this task?
This research question contributes toward security requirements engineer-
ing through (i) the clarification of ambiguous requirements, and (ii) the elici-
tation of previously unknown security requirements. In previous work, Kafalı
et al. [24] formally investigated the connections between the knowledge con-
tained in regulations and breach reports via normative reasoning. Here, we
empirically validate such connections by presenting our crowd workers with a
selected set of regulations from HIPAA that are associated with the breach
reports from HHS. We answer this research question by investigating the effect
of the variables in our studies, and gathering insights into the application of
our methodology.
Additionally, we show that more concise and more structured breach re-
ports can lead to more accurate extraction of relevant actions regarding the
avoidance and prevention of future breaches. We also discuss how automated
methods can help trim a breach report by identifying key sentences.
Our contributions include (i) a crowdsourcing methodology for extracting
normative elements from regulations and breach reports as well as its empirical
evaluation; (ii) demonstration of the need for concise and structured report-
ing of breaches; and (iii) a curated dataset of the results of applying Çorba
1 Çorba is Turkish for “Soup”: It acts as a memorable name for our methodology (close
to an acronym), and reflects the mixture of multiple artifacts contained in our study.
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on a selected set of regulations from HIPAA and breach reports from HHS,
including crowd worker responses and the extracted norms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the nec-
essary background. Section 3 describes our crowdsourcing methodology. Sec-
tion 4 details how we deploy our methodology on mTurk. Section 5 presents
our results. Section 6 presents the key findings. Section 7 discusses the threats
to validity as well as additional findings. Section 8 concludes with future di-
rections.
2 Background and Related Work
Norms: We now describe our formal representation for norms. A norm in
the particular sense we adopt here is a directed relationship between a subject
(the party on whom the norm is focused) and an object (the party with respect
to whom the norm arises) that regulates their interactions [42]. Each norm
also specifies an antecedent, the conditions under which the norm is effective,
and a consequence, the conditions that fully satisfy the norm. A set of norms
describes the social architecture of a sociotechnical system. We consider three
types of norms: commitments (c), authorizations (a), and prohibitions (p).
A commitment means that its subject is committed to its object to bringing
about the consequent if the antecedent holds. An authorization means that
its subject is authorized by its object to bring about the consequent if the
antecedent holds. A prohibition means that its subject is prohibited by its
object from bringing about the consequent if the antecedent holds.
We write a norm as n(sbj, obj, ant, con), where n, its type, is one of {c, a,
p}; sbj is its subject; obj its object; ant its antecedent; and con its consequent.
This conception of norms is compatible with previous models [3, 42] and avoids
some of the shortcomings of traditional deontic logic concepts pointed out by
von Wright [48].
Norms provide a natural formal representation for security and privacy
requirements [22, 23]. In addition to the required actions, desired states and
their conditions, norms describe the direction of accountability. The clause in
Textbox 1 may be formalized as this:
Type: c: Commitment
Subject: Covered entity or Business associate
Object: HHS
Antecedent: hardware and electronic media contain electronic PHI.
Consequent: implement policies and procedures that govern receipt, removal, and
movement of hardware and electronic media
The following norms are the extracted norms from Textbox 2 during our
experiments of Çorba.
Type: p: Prohibition
Subject: Employee (Sentence 1)
Object: Covered entity (Sentence 1)
Antecedent: portable devices contain PHI (Sentence 1)
Consequent: lose portable devices (Sentence 1)
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Type: c: Commitment
Subject: Covered entity (Sentence 7)
Object: Patients (Sentence 2)
Antecedent: TRUE (at all times)
Consequent: train employees on data loss, data protection (Sentence 7)
The second norm is actionable and connected to the above HIPAA clause
and can help prevent similar breaches. We omit other norms mentioned in
this report for brevity. This negative example, i.e., the breach of information
in Textbox 2 provides security analysts a clearer understanding as to how
the clause in Textbox 1 can be interpreted. Moreover, the breach report pro-
vides information regarding how to mitigate the breach, namely a data loss
prevention system and improved training of employees.
Studies have been conducted on norm extraction from business contracts[14]
and regulatory documents [19] where normative relations are explicitly de-
scribed. Social norms or conventions in a community, such as open source
software repositories, can be implicit and therefore are difficult to mine [9, 39].
Breach reports describe norms in an implicit or negative way. Albeit fruitful,
norm extraction from these textual artifacts poses new challenges.
Security Related Artifacts: Analyzing breaches helps analysts under-
stand how failures, e.g., unintentional or malicious actions by the software or
its users, affect compliance with applicable regulations. Gürses et al. [17] de-
velop heuristics for designing usable privacy interfaces in online social networks
based on investigation of privacy breaches. Their analysis helps in the under-
standing of privacy conflicts and trade-offs revealed by such breaches, with
respect to each stakeholder’s viewpoint. Kafalı et al.’s [24] framework com-
pares what happened in a breach with what the regulation states. However,
they do not provide a way of extracting norms from text.
Crowdsourcing: Whereas security requirements can be extracted through
the analysis of policies and regulations, analyzing such natural language text
is labor intensive and tedious for analysts. Crowdsourcing [7, 11, 15, 29, 35, 36,
49] of information extraction from legal text is a promising and popular ap-
proach to address this challenge. Breaux and Schaub [7] propose experiments
to compare the effectiveness (accuracy and cost) of untrained crowd workers
on a requirements extraction task with the effectiveness of trained experts
(i.e., requirements engineers). Their task includes extracting data collection,
sharing, and usage requirements from privacy policies. Breaux and Schaub re-
port that they could reduce manual extraction cost by up to 60% for some
policies while preserving task accuracy, and for some policies increase accu-
racy by 16%, based on their ways of task decomposition. They continue using
crowdsourcing, combined with NLP techniques, to extract privacy goals[4].
Reidenberg et al. [36] investigate how privacy policies are perceived by ex-
pert, knowledgeable, and typical users, and did not find significant differences
among them.
Text Analysis: The task of extracting useful information in a formal rep-
resentation from textual documents, such as security-related textual artifacts,
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is of great importance. Researchers start from designing and proposing sys-
tematic methodologies for manual extraction. Breaux et al. [6] have devel-
oped a methodology for manually extracting formal descriptions of rules, such
as rights and obligations, that govern information systems from regulatory
texts. They represent results from a case study on the text of HIPAA Privacy
Rule. Hashmi [19] presents a methodology for the extraction of legal norms
from regulatory documents that emphasizes logical structures for reasoning
and modeling to facilitate compliance checking. Systematic manual extraction
methodologies are helpful for domain experts to analyze text, but may not be
applicable to nonspecialists, such as typical workers in crowdsourcing projects.
Also, the transition from a manual extraction process to an automated one is
not straightforward and needs further investigation.
Automatically converting textual artifacts into a formal representation
is challenging, and may involve semantic comparison, summarization, and
rephrasing. Riaz et al. [37] describe a tool-assisted process that incorporates
machine learning for identifying security requirements from text. They em-
pirically derive a set of context-specific templates to translate such objectives
and goals into security requirements. Slankas et al. [43] propose an automated
process for extracting access control policies implicitly and explicitly defined
in natural language project artifacts. Zeni et al. propose the NómosT tool
[52] to help users construct goal-based representation of legal requirements
semi-automatically by identifying and using metadata in legal texts based on
their Nómos framework [40] and GaiusT framework [50, 51]. Sleimi et al. [44]
propose automated extraction rules for semantic metadata based on NLP,
which can help with understanding legal provisions. Current such automated
methods for extracting requirements from text either require domain-specific
knowledge and heuristics and therefore are costly to migrate to other domains,
or do not perform end-to-end extraction. We believe that using crowdsourcing
for the extraction task is more generalizable, but automated methods can be
leveraged to facilitate the extraction, which we discuss in Section 6.2.1.
3 Çorba Crowdsourcing Methodology
Çorba, our crowdsourcing methodology for extracting norms from text, con-
sists of data collection and evaluation steps. We design a survey for data col-
lection, which consists of two parts: (Part I) reading through a tutorial to help
crowd workers understand what is expected from them; and (Part II) answer-
ing multiple choice and free text response questions. Each crowd worker per-
forms Part II for five breach reports. In a pre-survey, we ask workers whether
they have seen legal text before to learn about their experience with the task.
At the end of the survey, workers rate the difficulty of the survey tasks. Details
of each task are described in Section 3.1. In the evaluation step, we analyze
the surveys received from workers by evaluating their responses according to
qualitative scales. Details of how we develop the qualitative scales and evaluate
worker responses are described in Section 3.2.
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Our core research question investigates the factors to consider when ap-
plying crowdsourcing to the extraction of norms from regulations and breach
reports. Specifically, we experiment on Çorba targeting the following refined
questions on factors that affect quality:
RQ1: How do the properties of a breach report, including its length, com-
plexity, perceived difficulty, and type of breach, affect the crowd workers’
performance?
RQ2: Are some elements of a norm more challenging than others to extract
from regulations and breach reports?
Figure 1 describes how we conducted our study. We first investigated how
project settings and task descriptions affect the quality of worker responses in
a pilot study. According to the preliminary analysis, we revised the settings
























Fig. 1 Overview of our study to evaluate Çorba. Numbers represent various steps. Solid
arrows are data collection steps. Dashed arrows represent evaluation steps.
3.1 Tasks
We create our survey with tasks that aim to extract key elements from breach
reports and regulations as well as to understand any relations between them.
Each task includes multiple choice questions or questions that require free
text input. Each survey starts with a breach report broken down into separate
sentences. We include sample screenshots from the survey in the Appendix (see
Figures 7–8 for the tutorial and Figure 9 for a worker response). More study
Çorba: Crowdsourcing for Requirements from Regulations and Breaches 9
materials can be found here: https://goo.gl/xda2nQ. The workers perform
the following four tasks regarding each breach:
Malice: Task 1 is to understand whether a breach occurred due to malice
or an accident (human error). We ask two five-point Likert scale [1] (“Strongly
disagree,” “Disagree,” “Neutral,” “Agree,” “Strongly agree”) questions: “The
incident described in the above breach report is caused by malicious intent.”
and “The incident described in the above breach report is due to accidental
human error.”
Breach: Task 2 is to extract normative elements from the breach report.
Since the general worker population might not be familiar with the concept,
we created simplified questions to extract such elements. In particular, workers
answer these questions and identify relevant sentences from the breach report:
(Breach.Action: Task 2.1) consequent: “What is the necessary action to pre-
vent this breach?” The answer to this question would be the consequent of
the norm that would mitigate this breach.
(Breach.Who: Task 2.2) subject: “Who should have taken that action?” The
answer to this question would be the subject of the norm.
(Breach.Condition: Task 2.3) antecedent: “In what circumstances should the
action be taken?” The answer to this question would be the antecedent of
the norm that describes the conditions under which the norm is in effect.
(Breach.Whom: Task 2.4) object: “Who (or what organization) is affected by
the breach?” The answer to this question would be the object of the norm.
Relevance: Task 3 is to understand whether the HIPAA clause covers
what happened in the given breach. We ask workers to rate a list of provided
HIPAA clauses on a four-point Likert scale: from “not relevant” to “exactly
the case in the breach.” In our study, we chose the targeted clauses before the
deployment semi-randomly, as described in Section 4.2.
Regulation: Task 4 is to extract normative elements from a regulation
clause. We show workers the most relevant clause (according to us), and ask
the following questions:
(Regulation.Who: Task 4.1) subject: “Who is the responsible party/individ-
ual for the above policy?”
(Regulation.Whom: Task 4.2) object: “To whom are they responsible?”
(Regulation.Action: Task 4.3) consequent: “What action should the responsi-
ble party (not) take to comply with the policy?”
(Regulation.Condition: Task 4.4) antecedent: “In what conditions should they
take the above action?”
We show Task 4 to a worker on a separate survey page after the worker
completes the first three tasks, since we do not want to bias the worker’s
answers for Task Relevance (Task 3).
We require workers to read through a tutorial before beginning the survey.
The tutorial includes a typical breach report, the task questions, and our
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preferred answers to them. Additionally, we provide compact and intuitive
explanations to the given answers. After the survey, we present workers with
two additional questions regarding the difficulties of understanding the breach
and the regulation clause, respectively.
3.2 Evaluating Worker Responses
The first and third authors act as evaluators to assess the quality of the worker
responses after each phase. The evaluators have been trained on regulations,
norms, and text analysis. For Likert scale questions, i.e., Tasks Malice (Task 1)
and Relevance (Task 3) in Section 3.1, the evaluators judge the quality of the
response by reading a worker’s response to multiple questions. The workers’
answers can be close to what the evaluators expect, e.g., compatible, or far
from what the evaluators expect, e.g., contradicting. Specifically, we use the
following scale:
(D) Deficient The worker’s response is empty, contradicting, or far from the
expected answer. A contradicting response can be inferred from multiple
answers that contradict with each other. Answers where a worker responds
randomly, or with a discernible pattern (e.g., the same answer to every
single question), are also considered as deficient.
(F) Fair. The worker’s response is fair if it contains answers with varying
quality. The response can also contain too many “neutral” or “somewhat”
choices where the answers are clear.
(C) Compatible. The worker’s response is within an acceptable range from the
expected answer. If the evaluator thinks the answer should be “Strongly
agree,” a response of “Strongly agree” or “Agree” is compatible.
For free text responses (Tasks Breach and Regulation in Section 3.1) from
workers, we use the following scale:
(B) Bad. The response is empty, random, or not relevant to the task. For
example, some workers copy and paste random sentences from the breach
reports to fill the survey.
(U) Unclear. The response is too long, not easily understandable, or not log-
ically sound. For example, one worker answered “no longer employed” as
the condition for “Federal Law Enforcement” to “add safeguard.”
(N) Not on topic. The response is somewhat relevant, but not to the point.
For example, some workers identify recovery actions “Return the stolen
documents” or “Offer free credit monitoring” as “the necessary action to
prevent this breach.” These answers are not irrelevant, but they are not
the specific actions to prevent the particular breach.
(A) Acceptable. The response is relevant to the task, but it could be phrased
better. For example, some workers copied phrases from the breach report,
and used improper tense.
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(E) Excellent. The response is composed of one or more of the potential an-
swers. For example, workers usually answer with only one of “Covered
Entity,” “Patients,” or “HHS” to the question “Who (or what organiza-
tion) is affected by the breach?”
The evaluators first individually evaluate each worker response. They then
discuss and resolve any disagreements that they might have. For the free text
responses, we consider disagreements between a relatively worse response (B,
U, N) and a better response (A, E). For multiple choice responses, we consider
disagreements between all evaluations. Note that we convert the evaluations
to numeric values for performing statistical analysis: Grades (D, F, C) are
transformed to (0.0, 0.5, 1.0) respectively; and Grades (B, U, N, A, E) are
transformed to (0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0) respectively. The scores of a worker’s
answers to one breach report are averaged to form one score for the quality of
the combined response.
Based on the evaluations, the evaluators work together to combine, clean,
and organize the worker responses, in order to obtain structured norms for
each breach report, which are the final results of applying this methodology.
4 Amazon Mechanical Turk Study
We applied Çorba on Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk). Our study design
was approved by NCSU’s institutional review board (IRB). Each task that a
worker performs in mTurk is called a human intelligence task (HIT). A batch
is a group of HITs with similar settings, which a requester can start and finish
at the same time. In our project design, workers needed to sign an informed
consent form before they accepted the HIT. We instructed each worker to
participate in our study no more than once, since we posted several batches
throughout our study.
4.1 Worker Groups
MTurk Requesters can create HITs with different Qualification requirements
2, and only workers that meet these Qualifications can access the HITs. In our
study, each batch required a Master Qualification, no Qualification, or a list of
pre-defined Qualifications. Accordingly, we formed the following three groups
of workers with the corresponding Qualifications.
Master workers are described by Amazon as “elite groups of workers who
have demonstrated accuracy on specific types of HITs on the Mechani-
cal Turk marketplace.” Amazon maintains the standard and statistics of
Master workers, and charges more fees for projects that requires a Masters
Qualification, which only Master workers can access.
2 https://www.mturk.com/mturk/help
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Regular workers are workers who do not need to meet any Qualifications.
Qualified workers are regular workers with additional Qualifications, specifi-
cally, those who (i) have 95% or higher approval rate from previous HITs,
(ii) have completed at least 100 HITs, and (iii) are located in an English-
speaking country.
4.2 Study Procedure
After some initial investigation of the HHS breach reports dataset and exten-
sive discussion, we selected 39 breach reports that reflected the distribution of
breach types. In a previous study [24], we have hired trained graduate students
to identify the most relevant HIPAA clauses to these breaches, by manually ex-
amining through every clause in the HIPAA security and privacy sections. The
39 breaches were mapped to eight clauses. We added 13 random clauses from
the same sections, so we could present five clauses, one of which was the most
relevant, to each crowd worker for Task Relevance (Task 3) of each breach. We
selected one breach report and answered the questionnaire as a tutorial, leaving
38 breach reports for the workers. Once workers read the tutorial, they were
shown links to five questionnaires regarding five randomly-chosen breaches
out of 38. Once workers finished all five questionnaires, they were prompted a
unique confirmation code, which could be submitted on mTurk to finish the
HIT and get paid. All worker responses were recorded in our database, along
with the time workers took to finish each breach questionnaire.
In our pilot study, we executed multiple batches with our initial task de-
sign involving different types of workers. Based on our findings, in our final
data collection project, we adjusted the survey questions and instructions, and
involved only qualified workers, which we discuss in detail in Section 5.1. In
addition, we shortened five breach reports producing three distinct versions
(see Section 5.2). These reports had received responses with the lowest qual-
ity. Thus, the total number of breaches used was 53 (38 + 5 × 3). Statistics
about the pilot and final studies, such as numbers of participating workers,
are shown in Table 1. In the pilot study, we rejected workers that did not
provide correct confirmation codes. In the final study, we examined all work-
ers’ responses as they arrived, and rejected workers that did not follow our
instructions for quality.
4.3 Compensation
Before the deployments, we estimated the time for finishing a survey as 20
minutes based on preliminary test runs. In our pilot study, we compensated
each accepted worker with $3 as base payment, and promised bonus for good
results, according to suggested rate on mTurk [12]. However, actual workers
finished the survey (with five breach reports) in the pilot study with a median
time of 32 minutes. We compensated workers with C, A, and E responses with
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Table 1 mTurk deployment statistics.
Study element Pilot Final
# survey questions (per breach) 15 16
# master workers 13 0
# regular workers with no qualifications 12 0
# regular workers with qualifications 13 42
# breach reports / # unique questionnaires 38 53
# regulation clauses for Task Relevance 21 21
# regulation clauses for Task Regulation 8 8
the bonus payment up to $2 (later increased to $3, see Section 5.2). Even
though ours was not a typical mTurk task, with a high variance of completion
times, most workers reflected that the compensations were fair, with a few
preferring more reward.
5 Crowdsourcing Study Results and Revisions
We compiled the assessments of our evaluators for the two studies: pilot and
final. We first present the results from the pilot study. Based on the results,
we describe our revisions. Then, we present the results from the final study.
5.1 Pilot Study Results
In the pilot study, we rejected workers who did not provide a correct confir-
mation code or whose answers were clearly incorrect. For example, one worker
answered every question with a single period character. We rejected three
workers (7.3%).
To compare the performances of workers on the tasks, we convert our
qualitative scales to a quantitative (0–1) scale, as described in Section 3.2. We
average the ratings of the two evaluators and then combine the ratings for all
tasks to get a quantitative evaluation for the quality of a response.
RQ1: Properties of a breach report include the length of the report, the
perceived difficulty of the extraction, and the type of the breach. We do not
find a significant correlation (p = 0.544 > 0.10) between the length of breach
reports (number of sentences) and the quality of worker responses. Note that
we recorded workers’ thoughts on the difficulty of each questionnaire. There
was a significant (p = 0.0008 < 0.01) yet weak correlation between the per-
ceived difficulty and number of sentences in breach reports with a correlation
coefficient of 0.229. This association may not be practically relevant, however.
We find larger variance in response quality among breach types, as provided
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by HHS. Figure 2 shows the average response quality for each type. For im-
proper disposal cases, workers have provided less than optimal answers like
“dispose of notes properly” or “retraining employees,” which only apply in
certain contexts. For hacking breaches, workers may have lacked necessary
technical knowledge, and provided answers like “don’t make server accessible
to internet all the time.”












Fig. 2 Performance across breach types in the pilot.
RQ2: We answer this research question by examining the response quality for
each survey task, since most of them (Tasks 2 and 4) correspond to elements of
the norms to be extracted. We find that the quality presented great variance
across tasks. Figure 3 shows the average quality for each task. Answers to
Tasks Breach.Condition (Task 2.3) and Regulation.Condition (Task 4.4) had
the lowest quality. These questions are regarding the antecedent of a norm (as
explained in Section 2). Many workers answered these questions with phrases
or sentences that did not describe conditions or circumstances. Answers to
Tasks Breach.Action (Task 2.1) and Regulation.Action (Task 4.3) also had
lower quality than others. These questions are regarding the actions, or the
consequences, of norms. Some workers tended to provide short and insufficient
answers to these questions. We notice that a lot of workers copied phrases
and sentences from reports, which could be acceptable answers, but usually
corresponded to a recovery action rather than the cause of a breach (which is
what Task Breach.Action asks), and were given in the wrong tense.
Worker groups: Figure 4 shows the average quality for each worker group.
Our analysis does not suggest any statistically significant differences regarding
the quality of responses among worker groups. In fact, qualified workers, i.e.,
regular workers that qualified for our specifications, yielded results with higher
quality on average. This result, while surprising, is compatible with previous
research on comparing experts with typical users for policy understanding
[36]. One possible reason for this result is that, although master workers yield
on average high quality results on a variety of work, they are not necessarily
familiar with text analysis, especially given that our project is an unusual one.
For example, some master workers may not be native English speakers.
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Fig. 3 Performance across tasks in the pilot.








Fig. 4 Performance across worker groups in the pilot.
Worker effort: Workers spent varied amounts of time on our survey. The
average time workers spent on the tutorial was 12.7 minutes, and the median
was two minutes. Average time spent on a questionnaire for one breach report
was 10.3 minutes, and the median was six minutes. We have not found sig-
nificant differences of the finish times among the worker groups (on average,
10.6, 10.0, and 10.1 minutes for master, regular, and qualified workers, respec-
tively). On average, workers finished our survey (with five breach reports) in
64.2 minutes. Median time was 32 minutes.
5.2 Study Revisions After Pilot
Based on the preliminary analysis, we revised the following:
Survey tasks: According to the relative task difficulties identified in Sec-
tion 5.1, we significantly revised the tasks that workers performed worse on,
and slightly revised other tasks. Specifically, we revised the following tasks
from Section 3.1:
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(Breach.Action: Task 2.1) consequent: “What is the necessary action to pre-
vent this breach? Please start your answer with a verb. Do not use past
tense.” We limited this question to prevention actions, and added specific
instructions to increase the quality of responses.
(Breach.Who: Task 2.2) subject: “Who should have taken that action? Please
keep in mind that this action is the same action you have given in the
previous question.” Based on the responses we analyzed, we included a
reminder in this question.
(Breach.Condtion: Task 2.3) antecedent: “Consider you are the responsible
person for carrying out the action in Question 1. Do you always have to take
that action, or only in specific circumstances? Please start your answer with
‘when’ or ‘if’.” We determined that the original Task Breach.Condition for
this task was vaguely stated. Therefore, we connected it to Task Breach.Action,
and gave workers specific directions for answering the question.
(Breach.Whom: Task 2.4) object: “Who (or what organization) is affected by
the breach? Please state ALL parties that (might) have been affected.
These are the people your answer to the second question should have pro-
tected.” We included some reminders in this question.
(Regulation.Who: Task 4.1) subject: “Who is the responsible party/benefi-
ciary for the above policy? State the name or role of this party/individual.”
After analyzing the worker responses, we identified that asking specific
questions based on whether the regulation clause was an authorization or
a commitment might increase the quality of responses. We kept “responsi-
ble party” for commitments and added “beneficiary” for authorizations.
(Regulation.Whom: Task 4.2) object: “To whom are they responsible? / Who
authorizes the beneficiary?” We revised this question to remind the worker
of the distinction between an authorization and a commitment.
(Regulation.Action: Task 4.3) consequent: “What action should/may the re-
sponsible party/beneficiary take to comply with the policy?” We revised
this question to remind the worker about the distinction between an au-
thorization and a commitment.
(Regulation.Condition: Task 4.4) antecedent: “Consider you are the responsi-
ble person for carrying out the action in Question 3. Do you always have to
/are you always authorized to take that action, or only in specific circum-
stances? Please start your answer with ‘when’ or ‘if’.” we connected this
question to Task Regulation.Action, and gave workers specific directions
for answering the question.
Moreover, we added one question to Task Breach.
(Breach.Recovery: Task 2.5) “What are the actions/steps taken after the breach
has happened? If such (recovery) actions are not stated in the breach re-
port, answer ‘Not stated’.” In addition to the norm that would prevent the
breach by eliminating its cause, the answer to this question would be the
consequent of an alternative norm that describes a recovery plan for the
aftermath of a breach.
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Breach modifications: After analyzing the average quality of the extrac-
tion, we have identified five breach reports that received unsatisfactory results.
We believe that, if these breach reports are presented in a more concise and
structured way, workers may provide more usable responses. We prepared three
separate versions (in addition to the original description) for each of the five
breach reports. Three authors slimmed down the reports individually with
the goal of reducing complexity. We took out sentences that we thought were
irrelevant to our survey questions. For example, sentences regarding breach
notifications (“The CE provided breach notification to HHS . . . ”) or OCR as-
surances (“OCR obtained assurances that the CE implemented the corrective
actions noted above”) bear no grave significance in the remedy and prevention
of the breaches, and they were contained in the majority of breach reports.
We include the original and a modified version of an example breach in the
Appendix. The results for these revisions are presented in Section 6.2.
Worker groups: Since we did not find any statistically significant difference
between the quality of responses from worker groups, we chose to deploy the
final study using qualified workers, i.e., regular workers with qualifications,
which was the best performing group on average.
Compensation: To encourage and reward better quality responses, we in-
creased the bonus payment to $3.
5.3 Final Study Results
In the final study, we rejected workers that participated in multiple batches or
provided clearly incorrect or random answers. In addition, we rejected workers
that did not follow our instructions. In this manner, we rejected 11 (23.9%)
out of 46 workers. The average quality in the final study was 0.81, 13.9%
higher than the average quality of the same worker group (regular workers
with qualifications) in the pilot. The details of specific results regarding our
research questions are shown below.
RQ1: Figure 5 shows the average quality for each type of breach. The average
response quality for each breach type increased over the pilot study. Moreover,
there is no significant difference in quality among breach types.
RQ2: With our aforementioned revisions, we expected smaller variance
among tasks. Figure 6 shows the average quality of each task in our final
study.
We can see that the average quality of responses to Tasks Breach.Condition
(Task 2.3) and Regulation.Condition (Task 4.4) was still lower than the re-
sponse quality for other tasks, but this response quality increased 53% and
39%, respectively. In addition, we observed that the response quality for Task
Breach.Action (Task 2.1) notably increased (27%). However, the response qual-
ity for Task Regulation.Action (Task 4.3) had a smaller increase (10%), despite
having similar instructions.
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Fig. 5 Performance across breach types in the final study.
























Fig. 6 Performance across tasks in final study.
In the pilot, we observed that many workers responded “Always” or “In
every circumstance” to the questions that corresponded to the antecedent of a
norm, which was nonspecific and sometimes logically incorrect. In our revised
questionnaire, we asked workers to start their answers with “When” or “If.”
We observed a lot of responses like “When I’m accessing protected health
information then I believe yes I always have to take that action.” This answer
is more acceptable because it includes a valid antecedent (“accessing protected
health information”) for the action.
Worker performance: We also investigated other factors that might have
affected the crowd workers’ performance, such as perception, experience, and
learning curve. However, there was no significant correlation (p = 0.395 >
0.10) between the quality of responses and perceived difficulty. Among all
workers, 24.5% reported that they had no prior experience in regulatory text.
The average quality of their responses was 0.827, which was slightly higher than
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responses from workers with experience (0.801). We conclude that workers’
prior experience does not affect task performance (p = 0.646 > 0.10). Also, we
sought to understand whether workers performed better as they went further
along the survey, e.g., did they perform better for the last two breaches after
completing the first three? However, we did not find any significant difference.
Worker effort: In the final study, the average time each worker spent
on the tutorial was 4.3 minutes and the median was 3.2 minutes. The mean
time each worker spent on one breach was 12.9 minutes and the median was
9.5 minutes. The average time it took each worker to finish the entire study
was 68.9 minutes, which was slightly higher than the pilot. This increase is
reasonable since we had one more task in the final study.
Evaluation disagreements: Our evaluators had moderate agreement (Kappa
= 0.54, p < 0.001; 95% confidence interval from 0.503 to 0.578). They disagreed
on 16.6% of all evaluated entries, 62% of which came from Task Regulation, es-
pecially Task Regulation.Whom (Task 4.2) (26%). The disagreements resulted
from the evaluators’ different standards or understanding of the responses.
They resolved these disagreements through reexaminations and discussions.
5.4 Connecting Breach Reports to HIPAA Clauses
In Task 3, we have asked the crowd workers to rate the relevance of the HIPAA
clauses to the breach reports on a scale of 1 to 4 where 1 stands for “not
relevant” and 4 stands for “exactly the case in the breach.” For each breach
report, a worker is asked to rate five HIPAA clauses, one of which was identified
as the most relevant (in previous work [24]), and the other four were randomly
chosen. The crowd workers rated the most relevant clauses 2.7 on average, and
the others 2.3 on average. Details of the ratings can be found in our published
dataset.
We have asked the workers to extract requirements from both the breach
reports and the most relevant HIPAA clauses. For example, one worker pro-
vided “encrypting all flash drives containing electronic protected health infor-
mation” as the consequent of a norm extracted from a breach report about a
loss of a flash drive, whereas the consequent of the norm extracted from the
relevant clause was “implement ways to encrypt and decrypt protected health
information.” The former norm can be considered as a security requirement
that is more specific and practical than the latter legal requirement.
For some of the breach reports, the crowd workers rated HIPAA clauses
as the most relevant ones that are different from the ones identified in [24].
For example, in a Loss type of breach, employees used personal emails for
work purposes. The previous study [24] identified a clause on workstation
use (164.310(b)), whereas the workers rated a clause on security management
process (164.308(a)(1)(i)).
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5.5 From Crowd Responses to Norms
Table 2 shows all responses to Task Breach (Task 2) of the breach report
presented in Section 2. On average, each breach report received accepted
responses from 4.75 workers. In Table 2, each crowd worker, identified by
his/her ID, has given answers to four sub-tasks, namely, Breach.Action (Task
2.1), Breach.Who (Task 2.2), Breach.Condition (Task 2.3), and Breach.Whom
(Task 2.4). Each answer contains a textual response and the indices of sen-
tences that contain the response.
We use the same evaluators to formalize norms from these responses manu-
ally as the final results of Çorba. Since we have designed the questionnaires in
the format of norms, composing norms from the responses is straightforward,
which we describe below.
Table 2 Responses to Task Breach of the example breach.
ID Task Response Sentences




#323 Action The portable drive should have been better safe-
guarded, including using data encryption
1,7
Who The pharmacy resident 1
Condition When handling patients’ data it should always be
encrypted and handled with the utmost concern
1
Whom Arnold Palmer Hospital and some its patients who
were involved in a study
1,2,3
#333 Action Data extracted on the given information 6,7
Who protected health information 2,3
Condition Substitute notice was posted on the CE’s website 5,6
Whom protected health information 4,7
#344 Action Provide ample training to residents 7
Who Arnold Palmer Hospital 1
Condition When training for residents is necessary 7
Whom HHS, patients, and babies who were part of a study 2,3,4
#349 Action Train employees about data loss, data protection 7
Who the covered entity 7
Condition When PHI is involved . . . take the action 7
Whom patients, the covered entity, the employee involved 1,2
Response #312 contains only random answers, and therefore has been re-
jected. Response #333 has been rejected because the answers are clearly un-
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reasonable (“protected health information” to “who should have taken the
action”) and did not follow instructions. Note that Response #323 has been
evaluated as acceptable and therefore kept even though the answer to Task
Breach.Action did not start with a verb.
From Response #323, we directly obtain the norm c(employee, CE,
portable devices contain PHI, safeguard portable devices) or p(employee, CE,
portable devices contain PHI, lose portable devices), where CE stands for Cov-
ered Entity. This norm resides in Sentence 1. Since the answers are in style
of commitment, prohibition type of norms are concluded intuitively for bet-
ter understanding. From Responses #344 and #349, we directly obtain the
norm c(CE, patients, true, train employees on data loss and data protection).
Elements of this norm are extracted from Sentences 2 and 7.
In this manner, the evaluators have manually combined and collected 60
unique norms from the 38 breach reports. Examples given in Section 2 are
from this set. We did not perform this process for the regulatory clauses, as
we only included the most relevant eight clauses for norm extraction.
6 Discussion
Regulations and breach reports contain useful information that can help devel-
opers and security analysts prevent future breaches. Previous work has devel-
oped normative models [3, 18, 24, 42] to formalize such information. Çorba
is a solution for effective normative information extraction from regulations
and breach reports so that further automated reasoning techniques can be ap-
plied to help developers and security analysts reach their goals. In this section,
we present the key findings of our study, some additional findings regarding
breach report revisions, and some insights into automating such revisions.
6.1 Key Findings
As answers to our research question, we present the following key findings
regarding the designing of crowdsourcing projects for requirement extraction
from regulations and breach reports.
Research questions: By investigating RQ1, we have not found significant
correlations between the extraction performance and report lengths, complex-
ities, perceived difficulties, and type of breach. By investigating RQ2, we have
found that crowd workers give lower quality answers to tasks the required ac-
tions, and the conditions under which the actions are required. The format of
the survey question can have a considerable influence on their responses. With
instructions that are more detailed and tailored, the responses can be dramat-
ically improved. We have shown that personalized questions (e.g., “Consider
you are the responsible person for carrying out . . . ”), reminders (e.g., “Please
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keep in mind . . . ”), and specific instructions (e.g., “Start your answer with a
verb”) can improve response quality from workers.
Security requirements: The resulting norms extracted from the breach
reports can be considered as security requirements for socio-technical systems
[8] in the healthcare domain. The norms include software requirements (e.g.,
“conduct file transfers through a secured network” and “store PHI only in
encrypted programs”) and organizational policies (e.g., “validate contents of
letters before mailing” and “digitize and destroy hard copy records”). In addi-
tion, norms extracted from a breach report correspond to breach prevention,
the violation of which may lead to similar incidents. This information could
be of great help to security analysts.
Crowdsourcing: For a non-typical crowdsourcing study like ours, we need
to set up appropriate tasks and rewards. To improve the quality of the worker
responses, we provided detailed instructions in the final study, and rejected the
workers that did not follow instructions. The reward promised to the workers
was much higher than average projects on mTurk. We provided fitting rewards
and bonuses based on worker effort (time spent) and behavior, as an incentive,
to ensure the quality of their responses.
Deliverable: We have created a curated dataset with evaluated worker re-
sponses. This dataset can be used for future research to train automated tools
on mining normative elements. Our dataset contains 2,850 worker answers
from the pilot, and 3,360 answers from the final study. All responses have
been evaluated by two evaluators. Thus, our dataset includes a total of 6,210
evaluated answers. From these responses, we have concluded 60 refined norms.
Extracted norms are also connected to the selected HIPAA clauses with rele-
vance gradings from workers. We have made this dataset public alongside all
our study material here: https://goo.gl/xda2nQ.
6.2 Results from Breach Report Revisions
Through investigation of all breaches contained in the HHS breach reports as
well as evaluation of worker responses for a subset of the breaches, we have
identified that breach reports self-reported by end users often contain irrelevant
information for security requirements engineering. Table 3 summarizes the
average response quality across the breach versions that we have created for
the final study as well as the original descriptions used in both studies. Workers
in the final study performed remarkably better for those breaches than workers
in the pilot. Moreover, one of our breach versions (v2) yielded higher quality
responses (outperforming others on average and for three of the breaches).
Our revisions focused on the shortening of the breach reports by keeping only
the sentences that contained key information.
Our results have shown that most revised versions have outperformed the
original versions, and this kind of revisions can facilitate more effective infor-
mation extraction. Whereas this finding is promising, further guidelines and
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Table 3 Performance across breach versions. Boxes mark best performance in a row.
Breach Original Original v1 v2 v3
(Pilot) (Final)
#11 0.42 0.73 0.8 0.96 0.55
#27 0.67 0.74 0.64 0.83 0.78
#182 0.55 0.67 0.81 0.86 0.81
#495 0.6 0.72 0.86 0.79 0.83
#657 0.59 0.83 0.72 0.89 0.93
Average 0.57 0.74 0.77 0.87 0.78
templates for creating structured natural language documents would be help-
ful for producing good quality requirements [2]. Continuing this work could
be an interesting direction toward new standards such as those developed
by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for vulnerabilities
(CVSS) and misuses (CMSS), which facilitate data extraction and intra- and
inter-organizational analysis.
6.2.1 Automated Revisions
Automated methods can be leveraged to facilitate the aforementioned revi-
sions. Our curated dataset contains extracted norms from the breach reports
as well as the sentences from which the norm elements are extracted. Using
this information as a training set, we can use a probabilistic binary classifier to
identify the sentences that contain useful information toward norm extraction.
We have experimented this process using Paragraph Vectors [27], also
known as Doc2Vec, for document embedding and a probabilistic classifier, Lo-
gistic Model Trees [26, 46], for classification. Textbox 3 shows the automatic
ranking of sentences in Textbox 2 based on their probabilities of containing
useful information. The numbers leading the sentences mark the original order
of the sentences.
Using 0.50 as a threshold, the elements of the refined norms are from Sen-
tences 1, 2 and 7, which have been correctly identified. Sentence 6 is also likely
to contain a norm (implementing a data loss prevention system). Sentence 3
contains information regarding the affected patients (babies). Sentences 4, 5
and 8 are deemed to be less important. In fact, they were removed in at least
two revised versions. Using 10-fold cross validation, the accuracy of this clas-
sification is 76.6% (using 0.50 as a threshold).
This process ranks each sentence in a report by its relevance in norm ex-
traction. We can use this result to revise new breach reports by keeping only
relevant sentences. To improve the recall of retrieving relevant sentences, we
can use a lower threshold, e.g., 0.25, which will give us a recall of 91.1% with
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moderate precision (56.7%). Alternatively, we can highlight the sentences in
the reports with different colors corresponding to their importance, which
could facilitate crowd workers in the extraction.
Textbox 3
P=0.95 (1) An unencrypted portable data drive was lost by a phar-
macy resident of the Arnold Palmer Hospital, a part of the
covered entity (CE).
P=0.89 (6) The CE updated its policies and procedures for its data loss
prevention system and added controls.
P=0.76 (3) The missing drive also stored personal items, a research
study proposal, and two spreadsheets containing limited
information on 586 babies who were part of a study.
P=0.55 (7) The CE retrained the resident involved in the loss of data
and provided additional information to all employees and
medical staff members regarding the use of portable data
devices through education and published articles.
P=0.50 (2) The drive contained the protected health information (PHI)
of 586 individuals, including names, birth weights, gesta-
tional age, admission and discharge dates, medical record
numbers, and some transfer dates.
P=0.36 (5) Substitute notice was posted on the CE’s website.
P=0.18 (4) The CE provided breach notification to HHS, the media,
and to the parents of the affected individuals because they
were all minors.
P=0.06 (8) OCR obtained assurances that the CE implemented the
corrective actions listed above.
7 Threats to Validity
In this section, we discuss the threats to validity of our methodology.
Generalizability and scalability: Overall, we employed 80 workers in our
study. Workers spent longer on our HIT that a typical one and had to work
on several questionnaires. We collected 6,210 individual responses from the
workers. Analysis of such data requires considerable evaluation effort. Still, this
sample may not be large enough to draw general conclusions about information
extraction tasks. Moreover, we crowdsourced the analysis of 38 breach reports,
which is a small fraction of approximately 1,000 reports. We attempted to cover
different types of breaches with our selection, but other reports may include
unique information that needs individual examination.
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To scale the extraction up to larger datasets, we need to deploy more
batches of the same questionnaires, which requires additional financial and
time costs. In our study, each batch took approximately three dollars per
report and five days per batch on average. However, we do not think this
is a major issue with current number of available breach reports (about two
thousand on HHS website as of 2018). It is practical to increase our dataset
using the current methodology, and integrate the automation process when
the dataset is reasonably large. Also, we need to conduct extensive studies
to validate the drafting guideline. In addition, our study has been limited to
HIPAA and HHS breach reports. We need to evaluate our methodology by
applying it to other security related textual artifacts.
Question format: We have shown that the way in which a question is
framed can affect the quality of the responses. In our questionnaire, especially
in the pilot, we focused on the norms the violation of which led to the breaches.
Specifically, we asked for the necessary actions to prevent the breaches. How-
ever, breach reports additionally include useful information regarding actions
that should be taken after a breach, e.g., retraining of staff and notifications to
HHS and media. In the final study, we added Task Breach.Recovery (Task 2.5)
to mitigate this problem. One breach report may contain multiple norms that
are valid and important, which we should take into account when designing
such a questionnaire. In addition, our questions are predominantly asked in a
style of commitment norms since the HHS breach reports we adopted mostly
concern undesired disclosure of information. This limitation leaves room for
improvement since other settings may involve situations where a denial of
access is a violation of an authorization, which we retain in this work.
Legal expertise: None of the authors have expertise to investigate HIPAA
from a legal perspective. We have not consulted a legal expert to validate
the selection of the HIPAA clauses that we identify as the most relevant to
the associated breach reports. We have conducted our studies on a limited
collection of HIPAA clauses on security and privacy, each of which was shown
to the crowd workers verbatim. We have found that the clauses are fairly
easy to understand and do not present a large amount of ambiguities. To
further evaluate the effectiveness of crowdsourcing on elicitation of regulatory
requirements, we must take ambiguities in legal texts [30] into consideration.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented Çorba, a methodology for extracting and connecting use-
ful information, regarding the obtaining of security and privacy requirements,
from regulations and breach reports using crowdsourcing, as well as its eval-
uation on automated methods. Using our methodology, we have deployed a
crowdsourcing study on Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk). Capturing such
information would enable the specification of formal normative models upon
which automated reasoning can be performed to help software developers and
security analysts.
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We have showed that the crowdsourcing methodology, taking into account
proper question formats, instructions, and text revisions, can yield extraction
results with high quality. By leading the crowd workers to provide proper
answers with desired formats, we can significantly improve the quality of the
responses. We have created a curated dataset that contains 6,210 evaluated
worker responses performed by two evaluators. This dataset will be helpful
for future research to train natural language processing methods as well as to
design similar crowdsourcing tasks.
Future work includes additional methods to improve worker responses, such
as contest type tasks [13] and alternative worker compensations. We will ex-
plore the use of automated extraction tools to complementing the crowdsourc-
ing methodology. For example, we can automatically highlight parts of text
that have a high probability of containing a requirement, thus helping the
crowd worker identify valuable knowledge. To do so, we can use heuristics as
well as sequence labeling techniques, such as part-of-speech tagging, to find
each element from a sentence that contains a norm. Moreover, to validate the
applicability of Çorba in other domains, we plan to investigate the Verizon
Data Breach Investigations Reports [47], the DataLoss Database [10], and the
Principedia privacy incidents database [45].
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A Appendix
A.1 Breach Modifications
The original breach report for Breach #11 from Table 3 is shown below.
“On or around June 15, 2012, an employee of the covered entity (CE), Advanced Data Processing, Inc.
(ADP), dba Intermedix, who had access to patients’ protected health information (PHI) as part of her job,
inappropriately accessed the PHI of approximately 10,000 individuals and sold the information to third
parties. An addendum to the initial breach report, submitted on April 3, 2015, expanded the breach to an
additional 2,360 individuals. The PHI involved in the breach included patient names, social security numbers,
addresses, dates of birth, claims, and other financial information. The CE provided breach notification to
HHS, affected individuals, and the media and posted substitute notice. Following the breach, the CE engaged
a third party to review its network environment and make recommendations for security enhancements. It
implemented data loss prevention technology to identify electronic PHI and block transmittal of sensitive
information and a log management and analysis solution to automate collection, analysis, archival and
recovery of log data. The CE implemented policies and procedures for disposal and reuse of mobile devices,
as well as for the secure transport of sensitive information to, from, and between data centers. The CE
also created an information security team and appointed a committee to address compliance. Additionally,
the CE improved its employee training program and launched a vendor management program to ensure the
safeguarding of ePHI by its business associates. OCR obtained assurances that the CE implemented the
correction actions listed above. The CE also initiated upgrades to its data center security and workstation
antivirus technology.”
The modified breach report v2 for Breach #11 from Table 3 is shown below.
“On or around June 15, 2012, an employee of the covered entity (CE), Advanced Data Processing, Inc.
(ADP), dba Intermedix, who had access to patients’ protected health information (PHI) as part of her job,
inappropriately accessed the PHI of approximately 10,000 individuals and sold the information to third
parties. The PHI involved in the breach included patient names, social security numbers, addresses, dates of
birth, claims, and other financial information. Following the breach, the CE engaged a third party to review
its network environment and make recommendations for security enhancements. It implemented data loss
prevention technology to identify electronic PHI and block transmittal of sensitive information and a log
management and analysis solution to automate collection, analysis, archival and recovery of log data. The
CE implemented policies and procedures for disposal and reuse of mobile devices, as well as for the secure
transport of sensitive information to, from, and between data centers. The CE also created an information
security team and appointed a committee to address compliance. Additionally, the CE improved its employee
training program and launched a vendor management program to ensure the safeguarding of ePHI by its
business associates.”
A.2 Survey Tutorial
Figure 7 shows what the workers see in the study tutorial as a sample “correct” answer for
Task Malice (Task 1). Figure 8 shows what the workers see in the study tutorial as sample
“correct” answers for some of the questions under Task Breach (Task 2).
A.3 Worker Responses
Figure 9 shows answers from a sample worker for Task Regulation (Task 4).
Fig. 7 Survey tutorial: Task Malice (Task 1).
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Fig. 8 Survey tutorial: Part of Task Breach (Task 2).
Fig. 9 Worker Response: Task Regulation (Task 4).
